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Single Mothers Working at Night: Standard Work, Child Care Subsidies, and 
Implications for Welfare Reform 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper estimates the effect of child care subsidies on the standard work decision of 
single mothers and examines whether this effect differs between welfare recipients and 
nonrecipients.  The analysis uses data from the 1999 National Survey of America’s 
Families.  Results suggest that child care subsidy receipt is associated with a 6.9 
percentage point increase in the probability of single mothers’ working at standard jobs.  
When the effect of subsidy receipt is allowed to differ between welfare recipients and 
nonrecipients, results indicate that welfare recipients who are offered a child care subsidy 
are 14 percentage points more likely to work at standard jobs than others.  Among 
nonrecipients, child care subsidy receipt increases standard work probability by only 1.8 
percentage point.  These findings underscore the important role of child care subsidies in 
helping low income parents, especially welfare recipients, find jobs with conventional or 
standard schedules.  The results also lend support to the policy of giving priority to 
welfare recipients for child care subsidies.  Results are found to be robust to several 
specification checks.  
 
JEL Classification: J13, I38 
Key words: Child Care Subsidies, Standard work, Welfare, Single Mother
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“A Single parent is constantly scrambling for someone to care for her two preschool 
daughters while she processes paperwork and inmates at a county jail in Winston-Salem, 
N.C. Hers is an unpredictable, ever-shifting schedule. Some days, she picks up the phone 
and calls in her sister, who’s often busy with her own teen-ager. Some nights, she 
persuades a friend with two little ones of her own to let the girls sleep over.  Her 
predicament is shared by millions of Americans who find themselves working long, 
nonstandard, or erratic hours and having to hunt for child care to match” 
 
New York Times June 8, 1995 
 
I. Introduction 
Working outside the “standard” weekday hours of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. between 
Monday and Friday is an increasingly common practice in the United States.  For 
example, 34.3% of all female workers in the United States were nonstandard workers in 
1995 (Kalleberg et al. 1997).  The investigation of nonstandard work is important for a 
number of reasons.  First, there is evidence suggesting that workers engaged in 
nonstandard work are more likely to be assigned to routine jobs, and to receive less 
training and fewer promotions than others (Rothstein 1996; Barker 1993; Tilly 1996).  
Consequently, these workers tend to earn less, and are less likely to have health insurance 
and pension benefits than standard workers (Hipple and Stewart 1996; Loprest 2002).  
Along similar lines, there exists a positive link between the quality of an initial job and 
the likelihood of maintaining employment over time (Rangarajan, Schochet, and Chu 
1998; Strawn and Morrison 2000; Cancian and Meyer 2000).  Second, nonstandard work 
is linked to a number of adverse outcomes for parents and children, such as work and 
family conflicts, marital instability, health problems for both parents and children, and 
poor educational outcomes for children (Staines and Pleck 1983; Presser 2000; Heymann 
2000).  Finally, the majority of nonstandard workers work such schedules involuntarily 
and view their employment during nonstandard hours as an accommodation to labor 
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market needs, not as a personal preference.  According to Current Population Survey, 
more than half of the workers with nonstandard schedules report the nature of their jobs 
as the reason for their choice.  Only about six percent of nonstandard workers report 
working such schedules for better pay and only four percent give better child care as their 
reason for working nonstandard schedules (Beers 2000).   
With the passage of welfare reform in 1996, child care assistance has become a 
significant tool for helping welfare recipients move into the workforce and for helping 
other low-income families stay off welfare.1 According to the General Accounting 
Office, majority of states make welfare recipients and families making transition from 
welfare to work eligible for child care assistance or give them higher priority than other 
low-income families when resources are insufficient to cover all who apply (GAO 2003).  
Almost eight years after the welfare reform bill, Congress now debates legislation to 
reauthorize welfare reform, and child care funding remains a key issue.  However, very 
little is known about whether child care subsidies have in fact played a role in increasing 
employment among welfare recipients, or in general, among low income individuals in 
the post-welfare reform period (Blank 2002).  Even less is known about the effect of 
these subsidies on standard-nonstandard employment decisions of these individuals.   
Since the passage of welfare reform, the employment rate of single mothers has 
risen dramatically (Jones-DeWeer et al. 2003).  However, leaving welfare does not 
necessarily mean gaining adequate work and increasing economic self-sufficiency. For 
                                                 
1 The welfare reform legislation combined the previously existing four child care funding programs into the 
Child Care Development Fund (CCDF) and increased federal funding for child care substantially.  It also 
gave states greater flexibility in setting up and administering their programs. In fiscal year 1999, states 
spent all of their CCDF allocation of around $5 billion and spent directly on child care or transferred 
another $4 billion from the TANF funds.  See Blau (2003) for a summary of the system of child care 
assistance under welfare reform. 
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example, only eight percent of welfare leavers have been able to sustain employment 
over a period of four years (Martinson 2000).  Over three quarters (78 percent) of 
employed low income single mothers are concentrated in typically low-wage and low 
benefit occupations (Jones-DeWeer et al. 2003). These occupations typically demand a 
greater number of hours outside the standard weekday times of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.2 About 
one quarter of all welfare leavers worked night shifts or had irregular schedules on a 
regular basis in 1999 (Loprest 2002).  Despite gains in employment, about 52 percent of 
those who left welfare in 1999 had incomes below the poverty level (Nightingale 2002).  
Welfare reform might have been successful so far in helping welfare participants secure 
entry-level jobs.  However, there is a great deal of concern over the possibility that many 
former welfare recipients who have gone to work are having difficulty finding stable 
employment and are working at jobs with low wages and few benefits.  This paper 
examines the capability of child care subsidies to help mothers find jobs with 
conventional or standard schedules, the kind of jobs that usually pay higher wages, 
provide better benefits, and lead to long-term economic self-sufficiency of parents.  
A binary model of standard-nonstandard employment is estimated jointly with the 
binary models of subsidy receipt and labor force participation to control for endogeneity 
and selectivity, using full information maximum likelihood (FIML).   In order to address 
whether there exists a differential effect of subsidy receipt on standard work between 
welfare recipients and nonrecipients, the equations are re-estimated with an interaction of 
welfare and subsidy indicators in the standard work model.  This investigation is 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that the term “nonstandard” is not used to describe workers who are employed on a 
temporary basis. Rather it refers to the individual’s reported work schedule. 
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particularly important because many states give priority to families leaving welfare for 
child care assistance (Schumacher and Greenberg 1999).3   
The empirical analysis uses data from the 1999 National Survey of America’s 
Families (NSAF), conducted by the Urban Institute.  The NSAF provides the only 
available national household data from the post-welfare reform period with information 
on child care subsidies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the previous 
literature.  Section III describes the theoretical model and discusses the econometric 
approach.  Section IV introduces the data.  Section V presents the results and section VI 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. Previous Literature 
Although this is the first paper to examine the effect of child care subsidies on 
standard work decision, it is not the first to consider the relationship between child care 
subsidies and employment of mothers.  However, most of the literature on the impact of 
child care subsidies on employment focuses on the pre-welfare reform period.  Because 
welfare reform changed the systems of welfare and child care assistance dramatically, 
results from the pre-welfare reform period may be less relevant to the impact of current 
subsidies (Blau and Tekin 2003).   
One body of evidence on the association between child care subsidies and 
employment comes from several demonstration projects designed to help economically 
disadvantaged families.  These projects include child care subsidies along with other 
                                                 
3 Prior to 1996, welfare recipients had the priority in receiving child care subsidies.  This is no longer a 
requirement under federal law, although it is still often the case in practice. 
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benefits and services.  Most of these projects were conducted as randomized experiments 
prior to the 1996 welfare reform legislation and they typically find that employment 
increased as a result of the treatment.  However, the child care subsidy was only one of a 
large number of services and benefits provided to the treatment group. Therefore, it is not 
possible to isolate the actual subsidy impact from the overall program impact.4 
 The largest source of evidence on the effect of child care subsidies on 
employment comes from the studies using the cost child care.  These studies typically 
exploit the variation in child care costs across individuals and the geographic variation in 
the cost of child care.5  They implicitly rely on the strong assumption that there are no 
costs to taking up a subsidy in the form of either the time costs required to deal with the 
bureaucratic system or the stigma of participating in a means-tested program.  If this 
assumption is not true however, then the price effect would not be a reliable guide for the 
subsidy effect and the endogeneity of the decision to take up a subsidy must be addressed 
(Blau 2003). 
 Research on the impact of actual child care subsidies has been limited, primarily 
due to a lack of data.  Berger and Black (1992) and Gelbach (2002) examine the effect of 
child care subsidies by comparing the employment of two groups of mothers who are 
separated from each other by a natural experiment.  Both of these studies find positive 
impacts of child care subsidies on maternal employment.  Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf 
(2002) use data from a sample of low income single mothers (current and recent welfare 
recipients in California between 1992 and 1995) to estimate the probability of their child 
                                                 
4 Several examples of these demonstration projects are New Hope (Bos et al. 1999), the Teenage Parent 
Demonstration (Kisker et al. 1998), New Chance (Quint, Bos, and Polit 1997), GAIN in California (Riccio 
et al. 1994), the Minnesota Family Investment Program (Miller et al. 1997), and the Florida Family 
Transition Program (Bloom et al. 1999). 
5 See Anderson and Levine (2000) for an excellent summary of these studies. 
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care subsidy receipt and the effect of this probability on labor market activity.  The 
authors find that the probability of subsidy receipt is associated with an increase in the 
probability of employment.  Blau and Tekin (2003) analyze the determinants of receipt of 
child care subsidy and the effect of subsidy receipt on employment, unemployment, 
school attendance and welfare participation, using data from the NSAF.  The authors 
control for the endogeneity of child care subsidy receipt using instrumental variables.  
They find positive effects of child care subsidy receipt on employment. 
 The information on the link between the standard/nonstandard work and child 
care decisions of mothers is extremely limited and mostly descriptive in nature.  An 
important difference between the present analysis and previous research is that the focus 
here is on the standard-nonstandard work decision while previous studies concentrated on 
the effect of standard or nonstandard work on some other outcome measure like modes of 
child care or the decision to a receive child care subsidy (Burstein et al. 2001; Georges et 
al. 2001; Presser 1986; Presser 1988; Brayfield 1995; Casper and O’Connell 1998; 
Chaplin et al. 1999; and Kimmel and Powell 2001).  With the exception of Kimmel and 
Powell (2001), none of them addressed the endogeneity of standard/nonstandard work 
status.  Kimmel and Powell (2001) examine the impact of standard work on child care 
choices of single mothers and find that work patterns play an important role in mothers’ 
decisions regarding the mode of child care.   
 
III. Theoretical Model and Econometric Framework 
The behavioral model developed in this section serves as a guide for the 
econometric model used for estimating the effect of child care subsidies on standard 
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work.  Suppose that a single mother allocates her time between leisure and work.  She 
either works during standard hours or nonstandard hours but not both.  If she does not 
work, she provides child care during her leisure hours.  During her work hours, she can 
use market care or receive free care from a relative.  The relative is assumed to allocate 
her time between child care and leisure with employment ruled out for simplicity.  
Although the choice of paid versus unpaid care and the employment decision of the 
relative are not part of the empirical model, they are considered in the theory in order to 
account for the use of unpaid child care (Blau and Tekin 2003).  The mother can receive a 
child care subsidy if she is eligible for one.  In addition to satisfying the income 
condition, she must either be employed or in a work-related activity to be eligible for a 
subsidy as required by the law.   Finally, it is assumed that the mother may derive 
disutility from receiving a child care subsidy as a result of stigma. 
Under these assumptions, a mother maximizes her utility subject to her budget 
and time constraints, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
U = U(C, dstHst+(1-dst)Hnst, Lr, qss) 
 
Lm + dstHst + (1-dst)Hnst = 1,    Lr + J = 1,    
 
M + J = dstHst + (1-dst)Hnst,     JM = HstHnst = 0 
 
C + pM = Y + [dstHst + (1-dst)Hnst]w   if s=0 
 
C + (p-r)M = Y + [dstHst + (1-dst)Hnst]w(1-ts), if s=1, Y + hw ≤ Es, and Ts=1 
 
where 
 
 
U = utility 
C = consumption 
dst = binary indicator of standard work 
Hst = work hours during standard hours 
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Hnst = work hours during nonstandard hours 
Lr = relative’s leisure hours 
qs = the disutility of receiving a subsidy 
s = binary indicator of subsidy receipt 
Lm = mother’s leisure hours 
J = hours of free care received from the relative 
M = hours of paid care purchased in the market 
p = price of child care per hour 
Y = nonwage income 
w = hourly wage rate 
Es = the income eligibility limit for child care subsidy 
r = the subsidy rate per hour of child care if income is zero 
ts = the rate at which child care assistance is reduced as earnings rise 
Ts = a binary variable indicating whether an eligible mother is actually offered   
a subsidy 
 
Assume also that the disutility derived from working during standard hours is less 
than the disutility derived during nonstandard hours, i.e., |dU/dHst|< |dU/dHnst|.  The 
mother chooses C, dst, Hst, Hnst,w, Lr, s, Lm, J, and M to maximize her utility subject to 
her constraints.  The set of alternative available to a single mother are displayed in Table 
1. She chooses the alternative that gives her the highest utility. 
Let Vi be the indirect utility associated with alternative i, which can be derived by 
solving the optimization problem.  Given Table 1, the value of receiving a subsidy can be 
written as  
Vi(s=1) = max{Vi3(Y, p), Vi6(Y, w, p, r, Es, qs, ts), Vi9((Y, w, p, r, Es, qs, ts)}. 
Similarly, the value of not receiving a subsidy is 
Vi(s=0) = max{Vi1(Y), Vi2(Y), Vi4(Y, w), Vi5(Y, w, p), Vi7(Y, w), Vi8(Y, w, p)}. 
A single mother will receive a subsidy if Vi(s=1)>Vi(s=0), Y + hW ≤ Es, and 
Ts=1.  Thus, a reduced form model of subsidy receipt is a function of non-wage income, 
prices, all the exogenous variables in the model, and the Ts. 
si = si(Y, p, r, w, qs, ts, Es, Ts)       (1) 
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Let Pr(dsti=1|si=1, Ei=1) be the probability of standard employment conditional on 
receiving a subsidy and being employed, where Ei is a binary indicator of employment. 
Then 
Pr(dsti=1|si=1, Ei=1) = Pr(Vi6(Y, w, p, r, Es, qs, ts) > Vi9(Y, w, p, r, Es, qs, ts)) 
 
Similarly, the probability of standard employment conditional on not receiving a subsidy 
but being employed is 
Pr(dsti=1|si=0, Ei=1) = Pr(max{Vi4(Y, w), Vi5(Y, w, p)}> max{(Vi7(Y, w), Vi8(Y, 
w, p)}). 
Therefore, the probability of standard employment conditional on subsidy status 
can be expressed as 
dsti = dsti(s, E, Y, p, r, w, Es, qs, ts)      (2) 
According to (1) and (2), the only valid identifying instrument for s is Ts.  Note 
that Ts is a binary variable indicating whether a single mother who is eligible for a 
subsidy is actually offered one.  It is assumed that the average amount of CCDF funds 
spent per child in a state and state’s percentage of eligible children served by child care 
subsidies are positively related to Ts.  These variables would both determine the state’s 
degree of generosity in providing child care assistance and capture the factors that 
determine how subsidies are rationed by states. Also, an eligible mother is more likely to 
receive a child care subsidy in states where mass media are used as a consumer education 
strategy in child care because she is more likely to be informed about the bureaucratic 
process, application procedures, and the various opportunities for child care assistance. 6  
                                                 
6 Only 12-15 percent of eligible families are served by a CCDF subsidy in 1998-1999 (The Administration 
for Children and Families 2000).  Therefore, it is hard to imagine that states can avoid rationing.  Evidence 
suggests that one third of states report that there is a waiting list for a child care subsidy.  Two-fifths of all 
states report that most eligible families are not aware of their eligibility. Only four states report that they 
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Based on the theoretical model, these factors should not influence equation (1) directly.  
One may argue that the parameters of the state child care subsidy system, such as r, ts, 
and Es would serve as identifying instruments by affecting whether a mother receives a 
subsidy, but conditional on receiving a subsidy, not affecting the standard employment 
decision.  However, as indicated by the model and expressed by equation (2), these 
variables affect the standard employment decision.  This is because the parameters that 
determine eligibility for a child care subsidy affect how much a mother can earn and thus 
the value of being employed and receiving a subsidy (Blau and Tekin 2003). 
Econometric Framework 
The objective of the paper is to evaluate the effect of child care subsidy receipt on 
standard employment.  Based on the theoretical model, the econometric model can be 
expressed by the following equations: 
 Si = Xiβ + Ziδ + Tsiµ + εi       (3) 
 STi = αSi + Xiγ + Ziζ + νi if Ei=1     (4) 
where Si is a binary indicator of subsidy receipt for mother i, STi is the binary outcome of 
standard employment, Xi is a vector of family characteristics, Zi is vectors of policy 
variables and other characteristics of the location of the residence of the family, εi and νi 
are disturbances, and β’s, δ’s, α, γ’s, and ζ’s are the parameters.   As the theoretical model 
implies, the demand for child care subsidies is determined by the price of child care, the 
mother’s wage rate, nonwage income, preferences for consumption relative to leisure, the 
parameters of the subsidy program, the stigma of participating in a means-tested program, 
etc.  These factors are determined in turn by family characteristics (X), the observed 
                                                                                                                                                 
could serve all eligible families. (Schulman, Blank, and Ewen 2001).  Also, the absence of a waiting list 
may simply be due to the fact that states simply turn away clients for whom funds are not available, without 
putting them on a waiting list (Blau and Tekin 2003). 
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features of the state child care subsidy system (Z and Ts), and unobserved family and 
state characteristics (ε).  Since equation (3) is a reduced form, it is not possible to identify 
the supply and demand effects of X, Z, and Ts.  Therefore, β’s, δ’s and µ’s are the net 
effects of demand and supply forces on the subsidy receipt. 
 Identifying the causal impact of child care subsidy receipt on work schedule in 
equation (4) is complicated by the possibility that εi and νi are correlated.  For example, a 
mother who is strongly motivated to work during standard hours may also be motivated 
to seek a child care subsidy in order to better accommodate her child care needs, 
generating a positive correlation between εi and νi.  Alternatively, administrators of the 
subsidy system may give priority to the least employable mothers (Blau and Tekin 2003), 
imparting a negative correlation. The theoretical model implies that the vector Ts is a 
valid identifying instrument since it can be appropriately excluded from the standard 
work equation.  Therefore, the factors that determine Ts are treated as identifying 
instruments.  As mentioned earlier, these characteristics include the average amount of 
CCDF funds spent per child in the state, the percentage of eligible children served in the 
state, and a binary variable indicating whether the state uses mass media as a consumer 
education strategy.     
Another complication arises from the fact that ST is observed only for workers 
(i.e., for those with E=1).  Thus, the estimates of equation (3) would be biased due to 
selection into labor force.  In order to address this problem, equations (3) and (4) are 
estimated jointly with a binary employment equation. The employment equation can be 
obtained from the theoretical model similar to the way the standard employment model is 
derived and can be denoted as  
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Ei = E(s, Y, p, r, w, Es, qs, ts). 
Replacing s by equation (3) and specifying a linear equation, Ei takes the following fully 
reduced form7 
 Ei = Xiξ+ Ziπ + Tsiφ + ηi       (5) 
Estimation of equations (3), (4), and (5) jointly using full information maximum 
likelihood requires calculating a trivariate integral.   This is accomplished by employing a 
random effects estimator with discrete factor approximation, also known as discrete 
factor method.  The discrete factor method is well suited for this study because it is a 
flexible method in the sense that it eliminates the need to evaluate multivariate normal 
integrals (See Blau and Hagy (1998), Mocan and Tekin (2003), Picone et al. (2003) for 
examples).  Using Monte Carlo methods, Mroz (1999) shows that the random effects 
estimator with discrete factor approximation is more robust to deviations from normality 
and quality of instruments than two-stage methods.   
To implement the discrete factor method, the following structure is imposed on 
the disturbances in equations (3)-(5): 
εi = ρ1u + λ1i,   
νi = ρ2u + λ2i,  
ηi = ρ3u + λ3i, 
where λ1, λ2, λ3 and u are independently distributed errors and with equation specific 
factor loading parameters ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3.  This structure places the restriction that all 
heterogeneity or the correlation across the error terms enters the model through the 
                                                 
7 Note that subsidy receipt is not in the employment equation. This is because the determinants of the 
subsidy receipt are substituted into the employment, which results in a fully reduced form equation. This is 
preferred because it is the subsidy receipt-standard work relationship that is the focus of this paper. See 
Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (2002) and Blau and Tekin (2003) for the effect of subsidy receipt on work-
nowork decision. 
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common factor u that is assumed to follow a discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer 
1984).  Specifically, Pr(u = ωk) = pk ≥ 0 for k = 1,….,K and ∑K pk = 1. The number of 
points of support K, the location of the support point ωk and their probabilities pk are 
called incidental parameters and are estimated jointly with the other parameters of the 
system of equations.8  Then the likelihood function for the system of equations can be 
written as 
L = ∏∑N
i
K
k
pkPr(Ei = 1| uk)Ei  (1 - Pr(Ei = 1| uk))1- Ei   Pr(STi=1| uk)Ei STi  (1 - Pr(STi=1| 
uk))Ei(1 –STi) Pr(Si = 1| uk)Si (1 - Pr(Si=1| uk) (1 – Si). 
 
IV. Data 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the second round of the National 
Survey of America’s Families (NSAF).  It was conducted by the Urban Institute between 
February and October 1999.9 The NSAF sample is representative of the United States 
civilian, non-institutionalized population under age 65.  Residents of 13 states and 
households with income below 200 percent of the federal poverty line were over-
sampled.  The over-sampled states contain more than half of the United States 
population.  Interviews were conducted with over 42,000 households.10  
                                                 
8 The location and the scale of the distribution of u are not identified.  Because each model contains an 
intercept and the factor loading parameters ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3 are estimated in the parameterization, ωk is 
restricted to be between 0 and 1 (Picone et al. 2003).  Further parameterization is specified as follows: ωk = 
exp(ak)/[1 + exp(ak)], k=2,….,k-1, and ω0 = 0 and ωK=1.  pk  = exp(bk)/ [1+ΣK-1exp(bk)] , k=1,…., K-1, and 
pK = 1/[1+ΣK-1exp(bk)].  a’s and b’s are free parameters to be estimated.  The likelihood function is 
maximized with respect to all the parameters including those representing heterogeneity. 
9 The first round of the NSAF was conducted in 1997 with a different sample.  There is a third wave 
conducted with another sample in 2001. The third wave has not been made public yet.   
10 These thirteen states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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The NSAF is an ideal data source for the purpose of this study for several reasons.  
First, it was specifically designed to analyze the consequences of devolution of 
responsibility for social programs from the federal government to the states.  Second, the 
NSAF is unique in the sense that it provides the only nationally representative household 
data on child care subsidies.  Previous studies relied exclusively on administrative data to 
evaluate the impact of child care subsidies.  However, there is no appropriate control 
group for administrative data since they usually contain information only on subsidy 
recipients.  Third, the second round of the NSAF was conducted three years after the 
welfare reform legislation.  In this respect, it represents a more comprehensive picture of 
the post-welfare reform environment.  Finally, the NSAF provides a large sample of 
single mothers.  I limit the sample to single mothers because the standard-nonstandard 
work behavior of married mothers may be quite different from that of single mothers as 
fathers are likely to be the primary child care provider when their spouses are at work.  
Also, single mothers are the primary target for assistance under welfare law.  As a matter 
of fact, they accounted for over 90 percent of TANF cases in 1998 (Committee on Ways 
and Means 2000).   
The sample used in the analysis contains 4,405 single mothers with at least one 
child under age 13.  The NSAF contains information on child care subsidy receipt for 
children under age 13, which is the cut-off age for eligibility under CCDF.  The mother is 
asked whether she receives any assistance paying for child care, including assistance 
from a welfare or a social services agency, her employer, and a non-custodial parent.  A 
mother is coded as receiving a child care subsidy if she reports that a welfare or a social 
services agency pays for all or part of the cost of child care for any of the children in the 
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family.  A mother is coded as working at a standard job if she reported performing her 
work during traditional hours of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. during business days (Monday to 
Friday).  Those who perform their work outside of those traditional hours are coded as 
working at nonstandard jobs.  This group may include mothers who work weekends, 
evenings, split shifts, or irregular daily or weekly schedules since the NSAF does not 
distinguish between various types of nonstandard hours. 
 Definitions and the descriptive statistics used in the analysis are presented in 
Table 2.  Column I shows the means for the whole sample and column II shows them for 
workers only.  Columns III and IV display the means for standard and nonstandard 
workers, respectively.  Column V displays the means for standard workers who are 
subsidy recipients and column VI displays the means for standard workers who are non-
recipients.  As shown in column I, 11.6 percent of the sample receives a child care 
subsidy.  The Administration for Children and Families (2000) predicts that between 12 
and 15 percent of all eligible families received a CCDF subsidy in 1998-1999.  The 
sample in this study includes all single mothers regardless of their income and some of 
these mothers are certainly ineligible for subsidies as their incomes exceed the threshold 
level.11  Thus, 11.6 percent subsidy coverage rate is not unreasonable.  The employment 
rate in the sample is 71.1 percent.  Among those who are employed, 20.7 percent work 
nonstandard hours.  Among workers, the subsidy receipt is higher for those who work 
standard hours than those who work nonstandard workers (13.1 percent versus 10.8 
percent).   
                                                 
11 By including all single mothers, I avoid conditioning on income from employment, which constitutes the 
majority income for the sample. See Blau and Tekin (2003) for a similar approach. 
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Welfare recipients constitute 15.8 percent of the full sample.  This figure matches 
perfectly with the Current Population Survey, which suggests a 15 percent welfare 
utilization rate for 1999 (Grogger 2003).  A higher percentage of nonstandard workers 
receive welfare than standard workers (14.2 percent versus 9.3 percent).  This is 
reasonable given that standard workers usually have higher nonwage income and 
education than nonstandard workers, which would make it harder for them to be eligible 
for welfare.  Furthermore, among standard workers, child care subsidy recipients are 
much more likely to be on welfare than nonrecipients, 29.4 percent versus 7.6 percent. 
Given the emphasis of the CCDF on giving priority to welfare recipients, the size of this 
difference is not surprising.  
As Table 2 illustrates, there are major differences in occupations between 
standard and nonstandard workers. A full description of the occupational indicators is 
provided in Table B1. Nonstandard workers are concentrated mostly in sectors with high 
demand for off-hour services.  For instance, standard workers are more likely to be 
employed in managerial, professional specialty, and administrative support occupations 
than nonstandard workers.  On the other hand, they are less likely to work in sales, 
protective services, service occupations, and occupations such as machine operators, 
assemblers, inspectors, handlers, helpers or cleaners.  The percentage of single mothers 
with less than a high school degree is approximately 8 percent for standard workers and 
15 percent for nonstandard workers.  This pattern is entirely reversed for college 
graduates with 8 percent of nonstandard and 17 percent of standard workers holding a 
bachelor degree or more.  These figures are consistent with those documented in previous 
studies using different data sources (e.g., Presser and Cox 1997; Kalleberg et al. 1997).  
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Finally, blacks constitute a much larger portion of subsidy recipients among standard 
workers compared to whites (41 percent versus 28 percent). 
In formulating equations (3), (4), and (5), I condition on a number of 
characteristics of the mother that reflect both demand and supply factors.  These include 
age, ethnicity, health status, education, presence of children, family structure, nonwage 
income, and region of residence.  In addition to these variables, the occupation fixed 
effects are included in the nonstandard employment equation in order to control for any 
unobserved differences in demand for standard workers across different occupations.  
The models also include state’s median income, unemployment rate for females, state’s 
percentage of female-headed households with children living under poverty, maximum 
reimbursement rate for licensed child care, maximum annual income for subsidy 
eligibility, and monthly copayment for child care for a family of three. 
 
V. Results 
The results of the employment equation estimated to control for selection into the 
labor force are displayed in Table A1.  They are mostly consistent with those usually 
found in the relevant literature.  Since this equation is not the central focus of the paper, 
the results will not be discussed in the text.   
Table 3 presents the estimates of the model for child care subsidy receipt. 12 The 
first column presents the coefficient estimates and the second column displays the 
                                                 
12 The results presented in this paper are taken from a model estimated with four points of support.  A 
model with five points of support did not provide a significant improvement in the likelihood over a model 
with four points of support. Although there is no standard theory about how to select the number of points 
of support in a finite sample, the consensus is to add points of support until the likelihood fails to improve 
significantly (Blau and Hagy 1998; Picone et al. 2003; Mocan and Tekin 2003).  Mroz (1999) shows that 
the likelihood ratio test performs well when determining the number of points of support.  The estimates of 
the heterogeneity parameters are presented in Appendix Table C1.    
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standard errors.  Linear probability models are estimated for ease of interpretation. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using weighted least squares. Blacks 
are more likely to receive a child care subsidy than both whites and other races.   The 
likelihood of subsidy receipt also increases with the number of children between ages 0-5 
and 6-13 and the effect is stronger for the younger age group (5 percentage points versus 
2.4 percentage points).  High school graduates and those with some college degree are 
3.6 and 6 percentage points more likely to receive a child care subsidy than high school 
dropouts, respectively.  Mothers with higher nonwage income are less likely to receive a 
child care subsidy than others.  A one thousand dollar increase in non-wage income 
results in a 3 percentage point decrease in the probability of receiving a child care 
subsidy.  The presence of an additional relative in the household decreases the probability 
of subsidy receipt by about 2 percentage points.     
It is important to note that the coefficients of the variables used as identifying 
instruments have the expected signs.  As displayed in Table 3, living in a state where 
mass media are used as a consumer education strategy for child care subsidies is 
associated with a 4 percentage point increase in child care subsidy receipt.  A one 
percentage point increase in the number of eligible children served by child care 
subsidies in a state increases the likelihood of subsidy receipt by a single mother by 0.78 
percentage points. An increase in the CCDF funds per child by 1,000 dollars is associated 
with only a 0.49 percentage point increase in the probability of subsidy receipt, but the 
coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant.  A specification test rejects the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of these three variables are jointly zero with a p-value of 
less than 0.001.  This indicates that it is unlikely that the model suffers from the problems 
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of weak instruments. 13 The coefficients on the parameters of the state’s subsidy program 
(co-payment, reimbursements rate, and income eligibility limit) also have the expected 
signs, however, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. 
Table 4 displays the results of the model for standard-nonstandard employment 
equation.  The variable of the primary interest, the receipt of a child care subsidy, has a 
positive and significant coefficient.  Single mothers who receive a child care subsidy are 
6.9 percentage points more likely to work standard hours than nonstandard hours, all else 
equal.  This finding underscores the importance of child care subsidies on facilitating the 
transition from nonstandard work to standard work among single mothers.  
Mothers with at least a bachelor’s degree are more likely to work at standard jobs 
than others. This is consistent with the fact that standard jobs are more human capital 
demanding than nonstandard jobs. Whites are about 4 percentage points more likely to 
work at standard jobs than are other races, but the coefficient is not significant. The 
number of children in the household is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of 
standard work, although the effect is significant only for younger children.  This is 
consistent with Presser and Cox (1997) and Kimmel and Powell (2001) who suggest that 
given the decision to work, mothers with more children may use nonstandard work as a 
means of juggling work and family 
As displayed in Table 4, occupational status is a significant determinant of a 
single mother’s work schedule.  Mothers working in technical, sales and support 
occupations, as well as protective services, precision production, craft, repairs, farming 
and fishing; or as machine operators, assemblers, handlers, equipment cleaners and 
                                                 
13 Bound et al. (1995) note that the use of instruments with little predictive power that explains the variation 
in the endogenous explanatory variables can lead to inconsistent estimates.  
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helpers are less likely to work standard schedules, compared to the omitted category 
(executive, administrative, managerial occupations), all else equal.  This result is not 
surprising because these are the types of occupations in which the demand for 
nonstandard hours is usually high (Presser and Cox 1997). 
As the descriptive statistics indicate, welfare recipients are more likely to work at 
nonstandard jobs than nonrecipients.  This may have unintended consequences in the 
long run as welfare recipients try to advance in their careers over time, especially if it is 
usually the standard jobs that lead to permanent employment.  Therefore, it is important 
to consider whether the impact of subsidy receipt differs between welfare recipients and 
non-recipients.  Normally an indicator for mother’s welfare receipt and its interaction 
with the subsidy receipt variable included in the standard-nonstandard work equation 
would provide the answer to this question.  However, welfare receipt is likely to be 
endogenous to both subsidy receipt and the standard work decision.14  Therefore, 
including welfare receipt as an explanatory variable in the standard work equation might 
introduce bias to the estimates.  In order to address this problem, the predicted probability 
of welfare receipt is constructed from a first stage regression.  Then this predicted 
probability and its interaction with the child care subsidy receipt are included in the 
standard work equation, which is estimated jointly with the labor force participation and 
child care subsidy receipt equations using the random effects estimator explained 
previously.15 The state’s earnings eligibility limit for TANF for a single parent family of 
                                                 
14 However, the problem of endogeneity may be less severe once the model is conditioned on employment. 
One can argue that once someone decides to work, whether she works standard or nonstandard hours is less 
likely to be correlated with the unobserved factors that are also correlated with welfare. 
15 An alternative to this approach would be to estimate an equation for welfare receipt jointly with the 
system of three equations.  However, this alternative is not chosen due to the sensitivity of results to 
heterogeneity specification and failure in convergence. 
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three and the maximum monthly TANF benefit level for a family of three are used as 
identifying instruments in the first stage. 
The results of the first stage welfare equation are reported in Table A2 and they 
behave as one would expect.  For example, less educated parents and parents with young 
children are more likely to use welfare than others. Whites, Hispanics, parents with better 
health and higher nonwage income are less likely to receive welfare than others.  The 
identifying instruments, the state’s TANF earnings eligibility and the maximum benefit 
level are statistically significant determinants of welfare receipt.  A one hundred dollar 
increase in the earnings eligibility limit for a single parent applicant increases her 
probability of welfare receipt by 1.18 percentage point. A one hundred dollar increase in 
the maximum TANF benefit level is associated with about 0.7 percentage point increase 
in welfare receipt.  One would argue that states with generous welfare policies would also 
adopt generous employment policies.  In this case, the instruments might be picking up 
the effects of these unobserved policy variables, thus should not be excluded from the 
second stage equation.  However, when included in the second stage standard-
nonstandard employment equation, none of the two instruments had a significant 
coefficient. 
The results of the standard work equation with the welfare variable and its 
interaction with subsidy receipt are presented in Table 5.  The coefficient estimates on 
welfare and its interaction with subsidy receipt indicate that child care subsidies serve as 
a major incentive for welfare recipients to work at standard jobs, but have a much smaller 
impact on nonrecipients.  A subsidy-receiving mother is only 1.8 percentage points more 
likely to work at a standard job than a nonrecipient mother if she is not on welfare.  This 
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is a particularly small effect.  However, if the mother is on welfare, she is 14.0 (1.8 + 
12.2) percentage points more likely to work at a standard job when she is offered a child 
care subsidy.  Similarly, welfare recipients are 15 percentage points less likely to work at 
standard jobs than nonrecipients if they are not offered a subsidy.  However, the effect 
goes down to 2.7 percentage points (-0.149 + 0.122) if they are offered a subsidy. These 
results suggest that child care subsidies induce welfare receiving mothers to work at 
standard jobs, but have much less of an effect for those who do not receive welfare.  Most 
notably, this finding supports the states’ current policy of giving priority to welfare 
recipients for child care subsidies.   
Specification Checks 
 Occupation Indicators 
As discussed earlier, the set of occupation dummies are strong determinants of 
standard work decision. These dummies are included in the analysis in order to control 
for the variation in the demand for standard hours and variability in the labor market 
conditions among occupations.  To ensure that the coefficient estimate of the child care 
subsidy receipt is not influenced by the possibility of the endogeneity of occupation 
indicators, the system of equations is estimated without these occupation indicators.   
Once these indicators are dropped, the effect of child care subsidy receipt is still 
statistically significant and is equal to 0.059, which is very close to the present estimate.  
Therefore, the effect of child care subsidy receipt is not sensitive to the omission of 
occupation indicators. 
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Parameters of the state’s child care subsidy system 
According to the theoretical model, the parameters of the state’s subsidy program 
(reimbursement rate, co-payment, income eligibility limit, etc) must enter all the 
equations.  However, it can be argued that these parameters are endogenous.  To address 
the possibility that the child care subsidy coefficient is contaminated by the endogeneity 
of the parameters of the state’s subsidy program, the system of equations is estimated 
without these parameters in all three models.  In a fully-reduced form model, these 
parameters are determined by observed parent characteristics, observed features of the 
state economy, and unobserved parent and state characteristics.  Dropping these variables 
had no substantial effect on the estimates.  Once these variables are dropped, the effect of 
child care subsidy coefficient on standard/nonstandard work becomes 0.073.  This result 
is not surprising since none of coefficients of these variables was statistically significant 
when included in the model originally. 
Identifying instruments 
The choice of identifying instruments for the coefficient of child care subsidy 
receipt is theoretically justified by the model presented earlier.  The statistical support for 
these variables is verified first by testing whether the coefficients of these variables have 
a statistically significant effect in the subsidy equation.  As mentioned earlier, the p-value 
from this test is less than 0.001, indicating that they are jointly significant.  This is not 
surprising given the fact that two of the three coefficients are highly significant 
individually in the subsidy equation as displayed in Table 3.  Furthermore, a specification 
test indicated that the three instruments are appropriately excluded from the standard 
employment equation and are not directly related to employment decision. In a model 
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with these three instruments included in the standard employment equation, none of the 
coefficients of the instruments were statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Childless women 
  
As a final attempt to investigate the identification issue further, I created a sample 
of childless women from the NSAF following Blau and Tekin (2003).  Since these 
women are ineligible for child care subsidies by definition, a predicted subsidy receipt for 
a woman with no child should not have any impact on the probability of her standard 
work.  I constructed a predicted subsidy for a sample of 4,582 childless women using the 
coefficients from a subsidy receipt regression.  After the predicted probability of subsidy 
receipt was constructed for each woman, I assigned a 1 to a woman’s status of child care 
subsidy if her probability is greater than 0.50 and a 0 if the probability is less than 0.50.  
Then I estimated the system of equations for subsidy receipt, standard employment, and 
labor force participation, using FIML.  The coefficient estimate on the predicted subsidy 
receipt turned out to be, although positive, small in magnitude (0.019) and statistically 
insignificant with a standard error of 0.162.  Therefore, the subsidy receipt has no impact 
for a group of mothers for whom no such effect is expected. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
The evidence linking the quality of the initial job to the probabilities of 
maintaining employment and promoting career advancement suggests that finding a job 
itself may not necessarily result in moving single mothers toward economic self-
sufficiency in the long run.  It is therefore important to encourage low-income parents to 
seek jobs with a potential to move them up the income ladder. This paper examines the 
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effectiveness of child care subsidies as a policy strategy for accomplishing this goal.  
Child care subsidies are an integral part of the new welfare system. Though subsidies are 
not usually limited to parents who are on welfare, they are especially vital for the success 
of welfare reform because of their role in helping parents make the transition from 
welfare to work and staying off welfare.  
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between child care subsidies and 
standard work using data from the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families.  The 
findings suggest that child care subsidies induce mothers to work at standard jobs.  
Specifically, single mothers with a child care subsidy are 6.9 percentage points more 
likely to work standard hours than others, all else being equal.  When the impact of 
subsidy receipt is allowed to differ between welfare recipients and non-recipients, results 
indicate that subsidies generate a relatively substantial incentive for single mothers to 
work at standard jobs while they have a much smaller impact on non-recipients.  These 
results underscore the importance of child care subsidies in helping low income parents, 
especially welfare recipients, find jobs with a potential for long term economic self-
sufficiency.  These findings are particularly meaningful given the states’ efforts to 
prioritize TANF recipients for child care assistance.  For example, during 1999, 27 states 
guaranteed child care assistance to families transitioning from TANF to work, and 15 
gave priority to those families (State Policy Demonstration Project 1999).  However, 
according to the General Accounting Office, 23 states made changes to their child care 
assistance programs and decreased the availability of assistance since January 2001, 
mainly because of the financial crisis they were facing and the exhaustion of TANF 
surplus from prior years (GAO 2003).  Given these facts, results presented in this paper 
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point to the need for a substantial increase in the amount of child care funding in the new 
welfare reform bill in order to enable TANF participants to achieve real economic 
security in the long term.      
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Table 1: Discrete Alternatives in the Theoretical Model 
Alternative Work Child Care Subsidy  Choice Variables 
1 None None None Y 
2 None Relative None Y 
  316 None Market Yes Y, p 
4 Standard Relative None Y, w 
5 Standard Market None Y, w, p 
6 Standard Market Yes Y, w, p, Es, r, qs, ts 
7 Nonstandard Relative None Y, w 
8 Nonstandard Market None Y, w, p 
9 Nonstandard Market Yes Y, w, p, Es, r, qs, ts 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 A single mother can still receive a child care subsidy even if she does not work if she is engaged in work 
related activities, such as training, going to school, etc. Although, I do not analyze the decisions on work-
related activities, this alternative is added to the choice set to account for those mothers. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name I.  
Full 
Sample 
II. 
Work 
III. 
Standard 
Work 
IV. 
Nonstandard 
Work 
V. 
Standard 
Work and 
Receive a 
Subsidy 
VI. 
Standard 
Work and Do 
Not Receive a 
Subsidy 
Mother works 0.711 
(0.147) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
Mother works at a standard job 0.564 
(0.496) 
0.793 
(0.405) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
Mother works as a nonstandard job 0.147 
(0.354) 
0.207 
(0.405) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Mother receives a child care subsidy 0.116 
(0.321) 
0.126 
(0.332) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
0.108* 
(0.310) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Mother receives welfare 0.158 
(0.365) 
0.103 
(0.305) 
0.093 
(0.291) 
0.142*** 
(0.349) 
0.305 
(0.256) 
0.061*** 
(0.005) 
Mother’s age 31.780 
(7.182) 
32.174 
(7.079) 
32.530 
(6.985) 
30.812*** 
(7.274) 
28.898 
(6.153) 
33.077*** 
(6.940) 
Mother’s race       
 Black  0.314 
(0.464) 
0.307 
(0.461) 
0.297 
(0.457) 
0.342** 
(0.475) 
0.412 
(0.493) 
0.280*** 
(0.449) 
 White 0.652 
(0.476) 
0.661 
(0.473) 
0.672 
(0.470) 
0.619** 
(0.486) 
0.557 
(0.498) 
0.689*** 
(0.463) 
 Other race a 0.035 
(0.183) 
0.033 
(0.178) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.039 
(0.193) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.172 
(0.378) 
0.149 
(0.356) 
0.148 
(0.355) 
0.153 
(0.360) 
0.157 
(0.364) 
0.146 
(0.354) 
Mother is in good health 0.835 
(0.371) 
0.879 
(0.327) 
0.884 
(0.320) 
0.858* 
(0.349) 
0.858 
(0.349) 
0.888 
(0.316) 
Number of relatives living in the     
household 
2.398 
(1.379) 
2.286 
(1.315) 
2.231 
(1.268) 
2.496*** 
(1.464) 
2.397 
(1.264) 
2.206** 
(1.267) 
Mother’s education       
  Less than high school a 0.149 
(0.356) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.079 
(0.269) 
0.146*** 
(0.354) 
0.071 
(0.257) 
0.080 
(0.271) 
  High school 0.366 
(0.482) 
0.363 
(0.481) 
0.359 
(0.480) 
0.379 
(0.486) 
0.437 
(0.497) 
0.348*** 
(0.473) 
  Some college 0.360 
(0.480) 
0.394 
(0.489) 
0.393 
(0.489) 
0.396 
(0.489) 
0.428 
(0.496) 
0.388 
(0.487) 
  Bachelor+ 0.126 
(0.332) 
0.150 
(0.358) 
0.169 
(0.375) 
0.079*** 
(0.269) 
0.065 
(0.246) 
0.184*** 
(0.388) 
Number of children         
  between ages 0-5 0.774 
(0.787) 
0.692 
(0.736) 
0.657 
(0.723) 
0.824*** 
(0.772) 
1.089 
(0.774) 
0.592*** 
(0.692) 
  between ages 6-13 1.207 
(1.070) 
1.189 
(1.029) 
1.193 
(1.146) 
1.188 
(0.996) 
0.969 
(1.036) 
1.221*** 
(0.086) 
Mother’s region of residence       
  South 0.290 
(0.454) 
0.284 
(0.451) 
0.281 
(0.450) 
0.294 
(0.456) 
0.203 
(0.403) 
0.293*** 
(0.455) 
  West 0.197 
(0.398) 
0.191 
(0.393) 
0.195 
(0.396) 
0.179 
(0.383) 
0.212 
(0.410) 
0.192 
(0.394) 
  Midwest 0.271 
(0.445) 
0.300 
(0.458) 
0.298 
(0.458) 
0.305 
(0.461) 
0.351 
(0.478) 
0.291** 
(0.454) 
  Northeast a 0.242 
(0.428) 
0.225 
(0.418) 
0.226 
(0.418) 
0.222 
(0.416) 
0.234 
(0.424) 
0.225 
(0.418) 
Nonwage income (/1000)b 3.399 
(7.158) 
3.387 
(6.808) 
3.492 
(6.992) 
2.983* 
(6.040) 
1.226 
(3.994) 
3.833 
(7.278)*** 
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Mother’s occupation       
  Occupation1a 0.076 
(0.264) 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.121 
(0.326) 
0.051*** 
(0.220) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
0.128*** 
(0.334) 
  Occupation2 0.087 
(0.282) 
0.123 
(0.328) 
0.140 
(0.344) 
0.069*** 
(0.254) 
0.086 
(0.281) 
0.145*** 
(0.352) 
  Occupation3 0.032 
(0.175) 
0.045 
(0.207) 
0.045 
(0.208) 
0.043 
(0.203) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
  Occupation4 0.079 
(0.270) 
0.112 
(0.315) 
0.100 
(0.300) 
0.157*** 
(0.364) 
0.126 
(0.333) 
0.096* 
(0.295) 
  Occupation5 0.175 
(0.380) 
0.246 
(0.431) 
0.271 
(0.445) 
0.149*** 
(0.357) 
0.357 
(0.480) 
0.258*** 
(0.438) 
  Occupation6 0.009 
(0.094) 
0.012 
(0.111) 
0.010 
(0.102) 
0.020* 
(0.140) 
0.006 
(0.078) 
0.011 
(0.105) 
  Occupation7 0.146 
(0.353) 
0.205 
(0.404) 
0.177 
(0.382) 
0.314*** 
(0.465) 
0.243 
(0.430) 
0.167*** 
(0.373) 
  Occupation8 0.023 
(0.150) 
0.032 
(0.177) 
0.033 
(0.180) 
0.028 
(0.164) 
0.025 
(0.155) 
0.035 
(0.183) 
  Occupation9 0.050 
(0.218) 
0.072 
(0.256) 
0.062 
(0.242) 
0.102*** 
(0.302) 
0.022 
(0.145) 
0.069*** 
(0.253) 
  Occupation10 0.009 
(0.096) 
0.013 
(0.114) 
0.014 
(0.120) 
0.008 
(0.088) 
0.009 
(0.096) 
0.015 
(0.123) 
  Occupation11 0.020 
(0.138) 
0.027 
(0.163) 
0.022 
(0.146) 
0.049*** 
(0.217) 
0.018 
(0.135) 
0.022 
(0.148) 
  Occupation12 0.005 
(0.072) 
0.007 
(0.085) 
0.007 
(0.082) 
0.009 
(0.096) 
0.003 
(0.055) 
0.007 
(0.086) 
State’s unemployment rate for 
   females b 
4.170 
(0.949) 
4.108 
(0.957) 
4.105 
(0.958) 
4.116 
(0.953) 
3.946 
(9.403) 
4.129*** 
(9.585) 
Maximum annual income for subsidy 
   eligibility (/100,000)c 
0.284 
(0.053) 
0.283 
(0.054) 
0.283 
(0.054) 
0.285 
(0.052) 
0.290 
(0.057) 
0.282*** 
(0.053) 
Monthly copayment for child care for 
   a family of three (/100) c 
0.514 
(0.384) 
0.518 
(0.378) 
0.518 
(0.379) 
0.515 
(0.374) 
0.454 
(0.371) 
0.528*** 
(0.379) 
Maximum state reimbursement rate 
   for licensed child care (/1000) c 
0.622 
(0.178) 
0.624 
(0.173) 
0.625 
(0.173) 
0.615 
(0.174) 
0.665 
(0.152) 
0.619*** 
(0.176) 
State’s TANF earnings eligibility for  
   a single parent family of three (for  
   applicants)  (/1000) d  
0.641 
(0.220) 
0.643 
(0.218) 
0.640 
(0.216) 
0.656* 
(0.223) 
0.683 
(0.219) 
0.633*** 
(0.215) 
State’s maximum TANF benefits for   
   a family of three (/1000) d 
0.446 
(0.188) 
0.451 
(0.188) 
0.451 
(0.187) 
0.449 
(0.193) 
0.498 
(0.173) 
0.444 
(0.188) 
State’s percentage of female-headed 
   households with children living  
   under poverty (/100) e 
0.370 
(0.083) 
0.367 
(0.083) 
0.366 
(0.082) 
0.369 
(0.085) 
0.357 
(0.088) 
0.368** 
(0.081) 
Percentage of eligible children served 
    in the state (/100) f  
0.116 
(0.041) 
0.114 
(0.041) 
0.114 
(0.041) 
0.116 
(0.042) 
0.118 
(0.044) 
0.113* 
(0.041) 
State uses mass media as a consumer 
    education strategy f 
0.714 
(0.452) 
0.718 
(0.450) 
0.718 
(0.450) 
0.715 
(0.452) 
0.738 
(0.440) 
0.715 
(0.451) 
Amount of CCDF funds spent per 
    child (/10,000) f 
0.529 
(0.183) 
0.535 
(0.182) 
0.534 
(0.186) 
0.536 
(0.186) 
0.570 
(0.164) 
0.529*** 
(0.183) 
State’s Median Income for a family 
    of three (/100,000) e 
0.452 
(0.055) 
0.454 
(0.059) 
0.454 
(0.055) 
0.453 
(0.056) 
0.463 
(0.047) 
0.452*** 
(0.056) 
Sample size 4,405 3,132 2,483 649 325 2,158 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significant difference in means between 
“standard work” and “nonstandard work” or “standard work and receive a subsidy” and “standard work and do not receive a 
subsidy” at  10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Nonwage income includes all income during 1996 except the mother’s 
earnings and income from means-tested programs. Descriptions of occupation indicators are listed in Table B1. 
a Omitted category.  b Source: Urban Institute’s State Database.  c Source: Children’s Defense Fund. 
d Source: State Policy Documentation Project.  e Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics. f Source:  Children Care Bureau. 
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Table 3 
  Determinants of Receipt of a Child Care Subsidy 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Mother’s age -0.015*** 0.006 
Age2 (/100) 0.018** 0.009 
Black  0.085*** 0.027 
White 0.012 0.026 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.004 0.014 
Mother is in good health -0.007 0.124 
Number of relatives living in the household -0.018*** 0.006 
High school 0.036*** 0.014 
Some college 0.060*** 0.015 
Bachelor+ 0.002 0.017 
Number of  children between ages 0-5 0.050*** 0.011 
Number of children  between ages 6-13 0.024*** 0.008 
South 0.027 0.022 
West 0.051** 0.023 
Midwest 0.002 0.016 
Nonwage income (/1000) -0.003*** 0.001 
State’s unemployment rate for females -0.212*** 0.076 
State’s percentage of female-headed households 
    with children living under poverty (/100) 
-0.087 
 
0.072 
 
Maximum state reimbursement rate for licensed 
    child care (/1000) 
0.042 
 
0.034 
 
Maximum annual income for subsidy eligibility 
    (/100,000) 
0.106 
 
0.707 
 
Monthly copayment for child care for a family of 
    three (/100) 
0.111 
 
0.106 
 
State’s Median Income for a family of three 
    (/100,000) 
0.056 
 
0.208 
 
Percentage of eligible children served in the state 
    (/100) 
0.782*** 
 
0.167 
 
State uses mass media as a consumer education 
    strategy 
0.035*** 
 
0.013 
 
Amount of CCDF funds spent per child (/10,000) 0.049 0.038 
Constant 0.292* 0.163 
Log-likelihood -4,567.2  
Sample size 4,405  
*, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%,  
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: The Estimated Coefficients of the Model for the Standard/Nonstandard 
Employment Model 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Mother receives a child care subsidy 0.069** 0.035 
Mother’s age 0.031*** 0.009 
Age2 (/1,000) -0.475*** 0.132 
Black  0.023 0.039 
White 0.042 0.043 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.023 0.019 
Mother is in good health 0.015 0.021 
Number of relatives living in the household -0.004 0.008 
High school 0.051* 0.028 
Some college 0.032 0.030 
Bachelor+ 0.095*** 0.036 
Number of  children between ages 0-5 -0.032** 0.015 
Number of children  between ages 6-13 -0.014 0.011 
South -0.016 0.033 
West 0.001 0.025 
Midwest -0.003 0.021 
Nonwage income (/1000) -0.001 0.001 
Occupation2 -0.035 0.026 
Occupation3 -0.102** 0.048 
Occupation4 -0.175*** 0.032 
Occupation5 -0.014 0.021 
Occupation6 -0.229*** 0.089 
Occupation7 -0.201*** 0.029 
Occupation8 -0.073* 0.040 
Occupation9 -0.188*** 0.044 
Occupation10 0.008 0.053 
Occupation11 0.246*** 0.061 
Occupation12 -0.142* 0.075 
State’s unemployment rate for females -0.008 0.131 
State’s percentage of female-headed households 
    with children living under poverty (/100) 
-0.076 
 
0.118 
 
Maximum state reimbursement rate for licensed 
    child care (/1000) 
0.027 
 
0.053 
 
Maximum annual income for subsidy eligibility 
    (/100,000) 
-0.281 
 
0.183 
 
Monthly copayment for child care for a family 
    of three (/100) 
0.011 
 
0.024 
 
State’s Median Income for a family of three 
     (/100,000) 
-0.367 
 
0.268 
 
Constant 0.427** 0.229 
Log-likelihood -4,567.2  
Sample size 3,132  
*, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%,  
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: The Estimated Coefficients of the Model for the Standard/Nonstandard 
Employment Model with Predicted Welfare Receipt 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Mother receives a child care subsidy 0.018* 0.101 
Predicted Welfare -0.149** 0.074 
Predicted Welfare*Subsidy 0.122* 0.067 
Mother’s age 0.029*** 0.009 
Age2 (/1000) -0.488*** 0.136 
Black  0.020 0.043 
White 0.031 0.040 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.017 0.016 
Mother is in good health 0.011 0.021 
Number of relatives living in the household -0.002 0.009 
High school 0.044 0.030 
Some college 0.024 0.031 
Bachelor+ 0.085*** 0.027 
Number of children between ages 0-5 -0.029** 0.138 
Number of children  between ages 6-13 -0.011 0.014 
South -0.016 0.028 
West 0.001 0.025 
Midwest -0.003 0.023 
Nonwage income (/1000) -0.001 0.001 
Occupation2 -0.032 0.022 
Occupation3 -0.096*** 0.045 
Occupation4 -0.156*** 0.029 
Occupation5 -0.012 0.020 
Occupation6 -0.209*** 0.078 
Occupation7 -0.183*** 0.027 
Occupation8 -0.072* 0.038 
Occupation9 -0.176*** 0.036 
Occupation10 0.006 0.050 
Occupation11 -0.238*** 0.056 
Occupation12 -0.120 0.092 
State’s unemployment rate for females -0.007 0.111 
State’s percentage of female-headed households 
    with children living under poverty (/100) 
-0.083 
 
0.129 
 
Maximum state reimbursement rate for licensed 
    child care (/1000) 
0.024 
 
0.054 
 
Maximum annual income for subsidy eligibility 
    (/100,000) 
-0.264 
 
0.168 
 
Monthly copayment for child care for a family of 
    three (/100) 
0.009 
 
0.025 
 
State’s Median Income for a family of three 
    (/100,000) 
-0.315 
 
0.254 
 
Constant -0.465*** 0.236 
Log-likelihood -4,558.5  
Sample size 3,132  
*, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%,  
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: The Estimated Coefficients of the Employment Model 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Mother’s age 0.036*** 0.009 
Age2 (/1000) -0.514*** 0.128 
Black  0.041 0.035 
White 0.033 0.031 
Hispanic Ethnicity -0.028* 0.016 
Mother is in good health 0.185*** 0.018 
Number of relatives living in the household 0.017** 0.008 
High school 0.214*** 0.023 
Some college 0.285*** 0.027 
Bachelor+ 0.312*** 0.025 
Number of  children between ages 0-5 -0.101*** 0.015 
Number of children  between ages 6-13 -0.045*** 0.012 
South 0.019 0.032 
West 0.021 0.023 
Midwest 0.074*** 0.025 
Nonwage income (/1000) -0.004*** 0.001 
State’s unemployment rate for females -0.192* 0.112 
State’s percentage of female-headed households 
    with children living under poverty (/100) 
-0.131 
 
0.122 
 
Maximum state reimbursement rate for licensed 
    child care (/1000) 
-0.035 
 
0.051 
 
Maximum annual income for subsidy eligibility 
    (/100,000) 
-0.383** 
 
0.166 
 
Monthly copayment for child care for a family 
    of three (/100) 
-0.005 
 
0.029 
 
State’s Median Income for a family of three 
    (/100,000) 
-0.039 
 
0.281 
 
Percentage of eligible children served in the state
   (/100) 
-0.174 
 
0.216 
 
State uses mass media as a consumer education 
strategy 
-0.002 
 
0.018 
 
Amount of CCDF funds spent per child 
    (/10,000) 
0.026 
 
0.054 
 
Constant 0.087 0.249 
Log-likelihood -4,567.2  
Sample size 4,405  
*, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%,  
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A2: The Estimated Coefficients of the First Stage Welfare Receipt Equation 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Mother’s age -0.025*** 0.007 
Age2 (/1000) 0.286*** 0.093 
Black  0.009 0.036 
White -0.048* 0.028 
Hispanic Ethnicity -0.051*** 0.015 
Mother is in good health -0.070*** 0.018 
Number of relatives living in the household 0.003 0.007 
High school -0.058*** 0.019 
Some college -0.079*** 0.021 
Bachelor+ -0.099*** 0.020 
Number of  children between ages 0-5 0.057*** 0.012 
Number of children  between ages 6-13 0.039*** 0.010 
South 0.015 0.034 
West 0.028 0.025 
Midwest -0.062*** 0.023 
Nonwage income (/1000) -0.014*** 0.001 
State’s unemployment rate for female workers -0.210** 0.099 
State’s percentage of female-headed households 
    with children living under poverty (/100) 
-0.036 
 
0.125 
 
Maximum state reimbursement rate for licensed 
    child care (/1000) 
-0.065 
 
0.071 
 
Maximum annual income for subsidy eligibility 
    (/100,000) 
0.055 
 
0.157 
 
Monthly copayment for child care for a family 
    of three (/100) 
0.006 
 
0.026 
 
State’s TANF earnings eligibility for a single 
    parent family of three (for applicants)  (/1000)
0.118** 
 
0.053 
 
State’s maximum TANF benefits for   
   a family of three (/1000) 
0.065* 
 
0.036 
 
State’s Median Income for a family of three 
    (/100,000) 
0.003 
 
0.255 
 
Percentage of eligible children served in the state
    (/100) 
0.551** 
 
0.246 
 
State uses mass media as a consumer education 
    strategy 
-0.005 
 
0.021 
 
Amount of CCDF funds spent per child 
    (/10,000) 
0.206*** 
 
0.055 
 
Constant 0.527** 0.216 
Log-likelihood -1,525.1  
Sample size 4,405  
*, **, and *** indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%,  
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Definitions of Occupation Indicators 
Occupation 1 : Binary indicator for executive, administrative, and managerial 
  occupations  
Occupation 2 : Binary indicator for professional specialty occupations 
Occupation 3 : Binary indicator for technicians and related support occupations 
Occupation 4 : Binary indicator for sales occupations 
Occupation 5 : Binary indicator for administrative support occupations 
Occupation 6 : Binary indicator for protective service occupations 
Occupation 7 : Binary indicator for service occupations 
Occupation 8 : Binary indicator for precision production, craft, and repair  
  occupations 
Occupation 9 : Binary indicator machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors 
Occupation 10 : Binary indicator for transportation, and material moving equipment 
  occupations 
Occupation 11 : Binary indicator for handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers 
Occupation 12 : Binary indicator for farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1: Heterogeneity Parameters 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Factor loading 1 0.877 1.112 
Factor loading 2 0.062 0.088 
Factor loading 3 0.714*** 0.031 
 Mass Point Probability Weight
1st support 0.000 0.009 
2nd support 0.356 0.589 
3rd support 0.441 0.108 
4th support 1.000 0.294 
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